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COMMENTS
Balancing Implied Fundamental Rights and
Reliance Interests: A Framework for
Limiting the Retroactive Effects of
Obergefell in Property Cases
Huiyi Chen†
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v
Hodges1 that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person [ ] under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”2 The Court
also held that states cannot withhold legal recognition of samesex marriages.3 The decision raises the following problem: Suppose that a couple was legally married before Obergefell in a state
recognizing same-sex marriage (a former recognition state), either because they traveled to the recognition state for the sole
purpose of getting married or resided there for a while before moving to a former nonrecognition state.4 For property rights purposes, at which date is the couple deemed married in the former
nonrecognition state after Obergefell? If Obergefell applies retroactively, it should be from the actual date of marriage. If not, it
should be from the date of the Obergefell decision.

† LLB 2011, Tsinghua University; MA 2013, Harvard University; JD Candidate
2017, The University of Chicago Law School.
1
135 S Ct 2584 (2015).
2
Id at 2604.
3
Id at 2607–08. The Court did not address the possibility that a state might refuse
to recognize marriages valid in another state on grounds other than the gender of the couple, such as incest or violations of age requirements. See generally id.
4
At the time Obergefell was decided, there were still fourteen nonrecognition states:
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Niraj Chokshi and
Jeff Guo, Statements from Leaders in the 14 States That Previously Did Not Allow Gay
Couples to Wed (Wash Post, June 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/TK5L-BBYE.
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To illustrate what is at stake, consider the following scenarios: Amy and Margaret were Texas residents. In 2010, they moved
to Massachusetts and were lawfully married there. Two years
later, they moved back to Texas, a nonrecognition and community
property state.5 After arriving in Texas, Amy bought a piece of
real property there with what would be considered community
funds if they were an opposite-sex couple, and held it in her name.
In 2014, Amy sold the property to Mark without Margaret’s consent.6 If the property were Amy and Margaret’s home, the transaction would be governed by Texas’s homestead law, which prohibits unilateral sales “without the joinder of the other spouse.”7
The validity of Mark’s title depends on when the couple is deemed
to have wed: if in 2010, his title is void, but if after Obergefell, it
is valid.
The issue of third-party reliance is not limited to states that
were, prior to Obergefell, both nonrecognition and community
property states.8 Imagine that a same-sex couple obtained property in a community property and former recognition state (for
example, California).9 They then moved to a separate-property10
and former nonrecognition state (for example, Ohio).11 Generally,
the recognition rule holds that moving across state lines does not
change the community or separate status of a married couple’s
property.12 But because the couple was not a “married couple” under Ohio law when they moved to Ohio, the recognition rule did
not apply. As a result, the property lost its community property
status. But if Obergefell applies retroactively, the property would
5
In a community property state, spouses co-own the property that they obtain during marriage (with certain exceptions). See Black’s Law Dictionary 338 (West 10th ed
2014) (defining “community-property state” and “community property”). Currently there
are nine community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
6
The scenario is adapted from a short article written by Professor William P.
LaPiana, who was among the first to flag the puzzle. See William P. LaPiana, Obergefell
v. Hodges: Legal Bases, Clashing Views, Open Questions, 40 Tax Mgmt Estates, Gifts &
Trusts J 206, 207 (2015).
7
Tex Fam Code Ann § 5.001.
8
Only two states were in both camps: Louisiana and Texas. Compare note 4 with
note 5.
9
See notes 4–5.
10 These states are also called “common-law states,” referring to “[a]ny state that
has not adopted a community-property regime.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 335 (cited in
note 5). “The chief difference [ ] between [the two regimes] is that in a common-law state,
a spouse has no vested interest in property held by the other spouse until (1) the filing of
a divorce action, or (2) the death of the other spouse.” Id.
11 See notes 4–5.
12 See, for example, In re Estate of Kessler, 203 NE2d 221, 222–23 (Ohio 1964).
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retain its community property status, with all of the restrictions
and rights attached to that status.
Here is an example of how these hypothetical scenarios might
play out in real cases.13 Consider the facts of Hard v Attorney General, Alabama,14 a case that recently came before the Eleventh
Circuit: In 2006, Alabama passed a constitutional amendment
that defined marriage as “a unique relationship between a man
and a woman.”15 Paul Hard and David Fancher, a gay couple married in Massachusetts in May 2011, returned to Alabama after
their nuptials. Less than three months after the marriage, David
died in an accident. In June 2012, the administrator of David’s
estate filed a wrongful death action.16 Under Alabama law, wrongful death damages “must be distributed according to the statute
of distributions,”17 with beneficiaries being determined at the
time of death.18 At the time of David’s death, his only heir under
Alabama law was his mother, Pat Fancher.19 At issue was
whether Paul was entitled to a spousal share of the sizable settlement.20 A retroactive application of Obergefell would have entitled
Paul to the spousal share. Otherwise, David’s surviving mother,
as his only heir, would receive the entire settlement.21
Welfare and tax benefits assigned to one’s spouse may also be
affected by the retroactivity of Obergefell.22 After the Court, in
13 For an attempt to get the Supreme Court to judge the validity of pre-Obergefell
legal agreements signed by one member of a same-sex couple and attempting to bind the
other, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Guglielmelli v State Farm Insurance Co, Docket
No 15-884, *i, 5–7 (US filed Dec 31, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 9697873),
cert denied, 136 S Ct 1659 (2016).
14 2016 WL 1579015 (11th Cir).
15 Ala Const Art I, § 36.03.
16 Hard, 2016 WL 1579015 at *1.
17 Ala Code § 6-5-410(c).
18 See, for example, Lowe v Fulford, 442 S2d 29, 31–32 (Ala 1983) (“Heirs are determined at the time of death.”).
19 Principal Brief of Appellant - Patricia Fancher, Hard v Fancher, Case No 15-13836,
*3–4 (11th Cir filed Oct 6, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 5915495) (“Fancher Brief”).
20 Hard, 2016 WL 1579015 at *1.
21 The Eleventh Circuit did not end up addressing the issue of retroactive application
because the particular controversy was held moot on unrelated grounds. See id at *2–3.
22 The question whether welfare and tax benefits are affected is a temporal choiceof-law question, because federal and state agencies have to decide whether a same-sex
couple was married during a certain period before Obergefell in order to determine the
allocation of certain benefits and duties. For a discussion of a similar choice-of-law issue
across geographic lines, see generally William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law
in Federal Statutes, 64 Stan L Rev 1371 (2012) (arguing that, given the diverse state law
definitions of “marriage,” striking down the federal statutory definition of marriage as
between one man and one woman in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) would cause
chaos unless Congress or the courts created a choice-of-law rule to replace it).
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United States v Windsor,23 struck down the Defense of Marriage
Act’s definition of “marriage” as between opposite sexes,24 some federal agencies have chosen to apply Windsor retroactively, despite
the possible additional administrative costs.25 After Obergefell,
similar voluntary retroactive efforts have materialized. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued guidance affirming
the limited retroactive effects of Obergefell on various welfare
plans.26 But even if more federal agencies choose to apply Obergefell
retroactively in the future, it remains unclear whether they are legally required to do so.27
This Comment attempts to solve a problem arising from
Obergefell—the significant disruption of settled property interests due to the retroactive application of the decision. Part I of
this Comment summarizes the development of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity, leading to a general rule of
full retroactivity established in Harper v Virginia Department of
Taxation.28 Part II synthesizes the current rules of retroactivity
in the context of the Obergefell problem and suggests three theories for limiting Obergefell’s retroactivity. Part III proposes a
framework for limiting the retroactive effects of Obergefell
through nonconstitutional remedial exceptions to the Harper rule
based on Reynoldsville Casket Co v Hyde.29 It then rebuts two theories that would provide stronger protection for reliance interests
in property cases than the remedial exceptions framework, but
are not viable under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
I. FOUR RETROACTIVITY MODES: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT LAW
This Part summarizes both the development of the Supreme
Court’s retroactivity precedents and the current state of the law.

23

133 S Ct 2675 (2013).
Id at 2682, 2695–96.
25 See, for example, LaPiana, 40 Tax Mgmt Estates, Gifts & Trusts J at 207 (cited in
note 6) (explaining that the Social Security Administration uses the date that the couple
was married, not the date that Windsor was decided, to ascertain their marriage date for
purposes of Social Security benefits).
26 See generally IRS, Application of Obergefell to Qualified Retirement Plans and
Health and Welfare Plans, Notice 2015–86, 2015-52 Int Reven Bull 887 (Dec 28, 2015).
27 For a challenge to Houston’s retroactive application of Obergefell, see Petitioners’
Reply, Pidgeon v Parker, No 15-0688, *5–9 (Tex filed Dec 11, 2015) (available on Westlaw
at 2015 WL 9356986) (“The Court should grant the petition to declare that Obergefell is
not (and cannot be) retroactive.”).
28 509 US 86, 97 (1993).
29 514 US 749 (1995).
24
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Part I.A begins with an introduction to the jurisprudential underpinnings of retroactivity and delineates four possible modes as
reference points for a later discussion of actual cases. Part I.B
then discusses the Court’s retroactivity precedents in criminal
law, foreshadowing a discussion of the development of retroactivity in civil litigation in Part I.C.
A.

Jurisprudential Underpinnings and the Four Potential
Modes of Retroactivity

There are two opposing jurisprudential theories of retroactivity. One is the Blackstonian or declaratory theory: A judge’s role
is to discover and not to make law. It is impossible for the law to
change at the hands of a judge. If a judge “discovers” a new rule,
it is understood to have been the law from time immemorial, and
there is technically no retroactivity problem.30 In line with this
theory, the Supreme Court once announced––in the context of
overruling unconstitutional precedents––that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”31 In effect, it is a complete retroactive application of the “new” constitutional rule to all underlying facts that happened before the
announcement of the new rule.
The other jurisprudential theory is the Austinian or positive
law theory: Judicial opinions, just like legislation, are the command of the sovereign.32 When the court announces a rule that
differs from a past rule, the law changes accordingly. Under this
model, one must answer the “thorny” question whether the new
rule is applicable to underlying facts occurring in the past.33
30 See Frederic Bloom, The Law’s Clock, 104 Georgetown L J 1, 19–20 (2015) (“Judges
are not ‘delegated to pronounce a new law,’ in Blackstone’s famous adage, ‘but [simply] to
maintain and expound the old one.’”) (brackets in original); Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal
Imperialism, 158 U Pa L Rev 1329, 1349–53 (2010) (“The [Blackstonian] theory forms one
of the central justifications for adjudicative retroactivity: if the Court is declaring what
the law is and has always been, then that declaration must have been the case at all earlier
times, even if contemporary case law suggests otherwise.”).
31 Norton v Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442 (1886). But see Paul Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U Pa L Rev 650,
650–53 (1962) (documenting the Supreme Court’s qualifications of the absolute rule of
retroactivity from Norton).
32 See LaCroix, 158 U Pa L Rev at 1349–53 (cited in note 30) (“The Austinian theory
. . . posits . . . that when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.”) (quotation
marks omitted).
33 Id.
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On a less abstract level, there are four relevant temporal
points in defining retroactivity: (1) when the events or facts giving
rise to the legal claim occur (“Transaction Time”); (2) when a party
files a lawsuit (“Filing Time”); (3) when a new constitutional rule
is rendered, often by a Supreme Court decision (“New Rule Time”);
and (4) when the lawsuit closes (“Closing Time”). As shown in Table 1, there are four possible sequences for these events, the only
difference being the relative position of the New Rule Time.
TABLE 1
Timeline
Mode 1

New Rule

Transaction Filing

Closing

Mode 2

Transaction New Rule

Filing

Closing

Mode 3

Transaction Filing

New Rule

Closing

Mode 4

Transaction Filing

Closing

New Rule

Mode 1 refers to a scenario in which the underlying facts happen after the New Rule Time. There is no retroactivity problem
because, strictly speaking, there is no “new rule” for the litigants.
Instead, there is simply an application of the rule that existed at
the Transaction Time. A retroactivity rule that requires application of the new rule only to cases under Mode 1 is called “pure
prospectivity.”34
Mode 4 is another extreme scenario: the New Rule Time occurs after a case has reached finality, when res judicata and issue
preclusion are applicable. Mode 4 also includes cases on collateral
attack, such as federal habeas corpus cases.35 A rule that requires

34 For a summary of courts’ definitions of “pure retroactivity,” “full retroactivity,”
“selective prospectivity,” and “pure prospectivity,” see Paul E. McGreal, A Tale of Two
Courts: The Alaska Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, and Retroactivity, 9
Alaska L Rev 305, 307 (1992).
35 When this Comment refers to “closing” a case or a case reaching “finality,” it refers
to the end of the direct review proceedings. That is why it classifies habeas corpus proceedings under Mode 4, as habeas cases are collateral attacks that are usually not bound by
issue preclusion and res judicata and are, in that sense, not “final.” As shown below, for
the purpose of this Comment, the Supreme Court’s treatment of habeas cases and its treatment of cases reaching finality in the usual sense of the word are not in principle different—the governing rule of full retroactivity does not, in general, apply to either type of
final cases. The same finality concern is present in both types of cases.
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retroactivity even under Mode 4 is called “pure retroactivity.”36 In
contrast, a rule that requires retroactivity for all cases except
those under Mode 4 is called “full retroactivity.”37
Modes 2 and 3 are the hard cases. Retroactivity under Mode 3
requires the new rule be applied either (1) to all cases pending
before courts at the New Rule Time or (2) only to the case in which
the new rule is announced, but not to any other case pending at
the New Rule Time. This second possibility is called “selective
prospectivity.”38 Mode 3 is the scenario of Hard, the wrongful
death case recently decided by the Eleventh Circuit. Mode 2 differs from Mode 3 in only one respect: the litigant already knows
about the new rule when she files the suit in Mode 2, but the
transaction underlying the suit occurred when the old rule was
still in effect in both modes. Mode 2, in the Obergefell context, refers to the scenario involving Amy, Margaret, and Mark—the
marriage and property transaction happened before Obergefell,
and Margaret has not yet filed her case. It is here that future litigation about the retroactivity of Obergefell will likely arise.
Table 2 provides a summary of the link between the different
retroactivity rules and the four modes.
TABLE 2

Mode 1
Mode 2
Mode 3

Pure
Retroactivity

Full
Retroactivity

R
R
R

R
R
R

Selective
Prospectivity

Pure
Prospectivity

R
R
NR
NR
R only for the
NR
case in which
the new rule
is announced,
and NR for all
other pending
cases.
Mode 4
R
NR
NR
NR
Note: “R” denotes that the new rule is retroactive, while “NR” denotes that
the new rule is not retroactive.

36

See McGreal, 9 Alaska L Rev at 307 (cited in note 34).
See id.
38 See id. Under “selective prospectivity,” retroactivity may apply to “selected cases
filed before” the New Rule Time, but it does not automatically apply. See id.
37
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The Warren Court and Retroactivity in Criminal Law

The Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence has experienced significant shifts beginning in the 1960s, when changes occurred against the backdrop of the Warren Court’s expansion of
criminal procedural rights through the overruling of constitutional precedents.39 One scholar remarked that “[b]y 1959, the
number of instances in which the Court had reversals involving
constitutional issues had grown to sixty; in the two decades which
followed, the Court overruled constitutional cases on no less than
forty-seven occasions.”40
The expansion of procedural rights might give prisoners an
opportunity to challenge convictions that no longer appear constitutional. But motivated by the liberal justices’ need to avoid a legal prison break (a retroactive application of the new rules that
might acquit many prisoners) and the conservative justices’ desire to engage in “damage control” for new rules they disliked,41
the Court broke from the norm42 of Blackstonian retroactivity.43
In Linkletter v Walker,44 the Court held that an exclusionary rule
did not apply retroactively to a habeas petitioner who was convicted before the rule was announced.45 The Court reasoned that
“the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect,”46 but reached in dictum a general rule of retroactivity for all
cases on direct review.47 As for habeas cases (Mode 4), the Court

39 See generally A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 Mich
L Rev 249 (1968). See also Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655–57 (1961) (establishing that the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 343–45 (1963) (establishing the right to
free counsel for indigent defendants in state criminal prosecutions); Miranda v Arizona,
384 US 436, 444–45 (1966) (establishing that individuals must be informed of their rights
before they are put under “custodial interrogation”).
40 Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law,
1980 Wis L Rev 467, 467 (citation omitted). See also Harper, 509 US at 109 (Scalia concurring) (listing as examples six constitutional cases the Supreme Court overruled between 1961 and 1967).
41 See Richard H. Fallon Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1739–40, 1745 (1991).
42 Harper, 509 US at 94 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s words that “‘retrospective operation’ [ ] has governed ‘[j]udicial decisions . . . for near a thousand years’”)
(brackets and ellipsis in original).
43 Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1739–40 (cited in note 41).
44 381 US 618 (1965).
45 Id at 619–20, 639–40.
46 Id at 629 (quoting in addition Justice Benjamin Cardozo as stating that “[w]e think
the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject”).
47 See id at 627.
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held that there was “no set principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.”48 The retroactivity of the new rule depended on the consideration of three factors: “the purpose of the [new] rule; the reliance placed upon the [old rule]; and the effect on the
administration of justice.”49
In the aftermath of Linkletter, some scholars severely criticized the factor-balancing approach to habeas cases. These scholars reasoned that the new rule should be retroactively applied in
all cases to free prisoners whose convictions were contaminated
by violations of the rule.50 This argument was based on the fact
that these “constitutional rights” reflected “fundamental norms”51
and the idea that the unreasonable reliance of state governments
on the old rule should not be protected.52
Two years after Linkletter, in Stovall v Denno,53 the Court affirmed the three-factor discretionary approach in Linkletter but
recognized that the different treatment of cases on direct and collateral review could not be justified.54 It rejected retroactive application of any new rule in all cases on direct or collateral review,
except in the case in which the new rule was announced to avoid
transforming the rule into a “mere dictum.”55 This is a rule of selective prospectivity.56 Justice John Marshall Harlan II criticized
the selective prospectivity rule in several dissenting and concurring opinions57 and characterized the rule as “[s]imply fishing one
case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a

48 Linkletter, 381 US at 627, citing Chicot County Drainage District v Baxter State
Bank, 308 US 371, 374 (1940) (quotation marks omitted).
49 Linkletter, 381 US at 636.
50 See, for example, Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A
Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U Chi L Rev 719, 747–50 (1966) (arguing that the newly
announced rules were really not new and that the unconstitutional nature of the violation
did not change based on when the defendant was convicted).
51 Id at 747–48.
52 Id. For a critique of the Court’s announcement of the judicial power to limit retroactivity, but not the result in Linkletter, see generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 Harv L Rev 56 (1965).
53 388 US 293 (1967).
54 Id at 297, 300–01.
55 Id at 300–01.
56 See text accompanying note 38.
57 See, for example, Desist v United States, 394 US 244, 258–59 (1969) (Harlan dissenting); Mackey v United States, 401 US 667, 676–81 (1971) (Harlan concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that
new rule.”58
Harlan lost the battle, but won the war. In Griffith v Kentucky,59
a criminal case on direct review, the Court abandoned the discretionary approach to retroactivity and held that “a new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to
all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.”60 In Teague v Lane,61 a case almost identical to Griffith except for its habeas status, the Court clarified that the Griffith rule
of general retroactivity does not apply to habeas cases.62 With
some refinement to the Teague rule,63 the controlling rule in criminal law is full retroactivity: a new constitutional rule applies retroactively to all pending and future cases on direct review, but
generally not to habeas cases (that is, Mode 4 cases). Although
not directly relevant to the Obergefell problem, the development
of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence in criminal
law foreshadows the development of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence in the civil context.
C.

Retroactivity in Civil Litigation: From Chevron Oil to
Reynoldsville Casket

The Supreme Court’s civil retroactivity precedents have gone
through a similar retroactivity—prospectivity—retroactivity pendulum. But they also present three unique questions: (1) Do differences between civil and criminal cases suggest that a different
treatment of retroactivity is necessary? (2) If so, is pure prospectivity still a possibility in the civil arena? (3) What is the difference between the issue of retroactivity and the issue of remedy?

58 Mackey, 401 US at 679 (Harlan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
59 479 US 314 (1987).
60 Id at 328.
61 489 US 288 (1989).
62 Id at 306–07, 309–10 (holding that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
will not be applicable to [collateral attack] cases” unless (1) the new rule “places certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe,” or (2) “it requires the observance of those procedures that . . . are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (quotation marks omitted and ellipsis in original).
63 See, for example, Danforth v Minnesota, 552 US 264, 266 (2008) (holding that
Teague does not preclude state courts from giving “broader [retroactive] effect to new rules
of criminal procedure than is required by [Teague]”); Montgomery v Louisiana, No 14-280,
slip op at 8 (US Jan 25, 2016) (holding that the substantive rule exception of Teague
“rest[s] upon constitutional premises” and is “binding on state courts”).
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The following distillation of Supreme Court precedents aims to
answer those three questions.
Chevron Oil Co v Huson64 is the civil counterpart of Linkletter.
The plaintiff was injured “while working on [the defendant’s] artificial island drilling rig,” located off the Louisiana coast.65 The
plaintiff brought a suit that was timely under the laches doctrine
that had historically been thought to govern such actions.66 The
Supreme Court, however, rendered a decision while the case was
pending, holding that Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations,
rather than the laches doctrine, governed actions for personal injuries occurring on artificial structures at sea.67 The new rule would
bar the plaintiff’s claim if applied retroactively. In Chevron Oil, the
Court proposed a three-factor discretionary approach: (1) whether
the decision “establish[ed] a new principle of law”; (2) whether retroactive application would “further or retard [the new rule’s] operation”; and (3) whether retroactive application would “produce substantial inequitable results.”68 After analyzing the three factors,
especially considering the plaintiff’s hardship in light of his justifiable reliance on the laches doctrine, the Court concluded that the
new statute of limitations did not apply retroactively.69
The soundness of the Chevron Oil test was challenged in
American Trucking Associations, Inc v Smith,70 in which only a
plurality of the justices applied Chevron Oil’s retroactivity test.71
At issue was whether an intervening Supreme Court decision
holding unconstitutional a state’s flat tax scheme on highway
trucks applied retroactively to a case involving a similar tax
scheme.72 The plurality insisted on applying the Chevron Oil test
and held that the new constitutional decision did not apply retroactively, despite the fact that the litigants in the intervening decision obtained a tax refund as a remedy.73 Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, writing for the plurality, emphasized the government’s
64

404 US 97 (1971).
Id at 98.
66 Id at 98–99. The laches doctrine provides a flexible statute of limitations for admiralty cases, under which the length of the statute of limitations is based on equitable factors. See Uisdean R. Vass and Xia Chen, The Admiralty Doctrine of Laches, 53 La L Rev
495, 495 (1992).
67 Rodrigue v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 395 US 352, 355 (1969).
68 Chevron Oil, 404 US at 106–07.
69 Id at 107–08.
70 496 US 167 (1990).
71 Id at 168, 179–86 (O’Connor) (plurality).
72 Id at 171–74 (O’Connor) (plurality).
73 Id at 182–83 (O’Connor) (plurality).
65
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justifiable reliance on the old rule and the severe administrative
burden if a refund was granted in the current case.74
The dissenting opinion, endorsed by four justices, explicitly
rejected Chevron Oil’s discretionary framework, reasoning that
unequal treatment of similarly situated litigants (such as those
in the intervening decision and in the case at bar) was not acceptable.75 The dissenters urged the Court to instead follow
Griffith’s abandonment of selective prospectivity.76 Interestingly, the dissenting opinion distinguished between “remedy” and
“retroactivity,” and reasoned that Chevron Oil was about the former, not the latter.77 In the words of Justice John Paul Stevens:
A decision may be denied “retroactive effect” in the sense that
conduct occurring prior to the date of decision is not judged
under current law, or it may be denied “retroactive effect” in
the sense that independent principles of law limit the relief
that a court may provide under current law.78
While retroactivity is a question of federal law that is binding
on state courts, remedy is “a mixed question of state and federal
law” upon which state courts may exercise some discretion.79 Essentially, the dissenters rejected selective prospectivity—if the
new rule is retroactively applied in the intervening case, it must
also be applied to all other pending cases. However, they also
acknowledged that the retroactive application of the new rule may
not be outcome determinative—some independent principle of
law, such as statutes of limitations or res judicata, may bar relief
or retroactive effect to the parties.80
Justice Antonin Scalia was the swing vote in American Trucking, yet his reasons for concurring in the judgment were very different from those of the plurality. He agreed with the dissenting
opinion that prospective overruling was inconsistent with federal
74 American Trucking, 496 US at 182–83 (O’Connor) (plurality) (“[I]t is clear that the
invalidation of the State’s [Highway Use Equalization] tax would have potentially disruptive consequences for the State and its citizens. A refund, if required by state or federal
law, could deplete the state treasury, thus threatening the State’s current operations and
future plans.”).
75 Id at 212 (Stevens dissenting).
76 Id at 212–16 (Stevens dissenting).
77 Id at 221–24 (Stevens dissenting) (“[T]he problem of the appropriate scope of federal equitable remedies [at issue in Chevron Oil] is distinct from the choice-of-law issue
[of retroactivity] implicated by this case.”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted).
78 American Trucking, 496 US at 209 (Stevens dissenting).
79 Id at 209–12 (Stevens dissenting).
80 See id at 212–18 (Stevens dissenting).
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judges’ Article III role.81 But, because he dissented in the intervening decision, he thought it “necessary” for him, “at least where his
vote is necessary to the disposition of the case,” to resist the retroactive application of the new rule he had previously opposed.82
O’Connor fought against the dissent’s demand to follow Griffith
because of the differences she perceived in civil and criminal law.
First, retroactive application of new procedural rules in criminal
cases inevitably benefits defendants, while in civil cases both plaintiffs and defendants may be benefited or harmed. In civil cases,
therefore, there is no special reason for retroactive application.83
Second, a prospectivity rule does not preclude the relying party in
civil cases from enjoying all of the new rule’s benefits. In the context of a tax, for example, the plaintiff could at least expect a future tax exemption. But in criminal cases, the only relief the defendant cares about is acquittal, which can be obtained only by
retroactive application of the new procedural rule.84
A year after American Trucking, the Court again tried to clarify the thorny issue of retroactivity in James B. Beam Distilling
Co v Georgia,85 producing five opinions, none controlling.86 The
plaintiff wanted to take advantage of a newly announced rule invalidating discriminatory excise taxes imposed on alcoholic beverages to obtain a tax refund under a similar tax scheme.87 This
time, a majority of the justices permitted retroactive application
of the new rule, but remanded the case to state court to determine
the remedy.88 A majority of the justices rejected selective prospectivity (applying the new rule only to the case in which it is announced but not to any other pending case) because it treated litigants in similar situations unequally.89 Yet only three of them

81

Id at 201 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
American Trucking, 496 US at 205 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
83 Id at 197–99 (O’Connor) (plurality).
84 Id (O’Connor) (plurality).
85 501 US 529 (1991).
86 See id at 531.
87 Id at 532–34 (Souter, joined by Stevens).
88 See id at 544 (Souter).
89 Beam, 501 US at 540–44 (Souter); id at 545 (White concurring in the judgment);
id at 548 (Blackmun concurring in the judgment, joined by Marshall and Scalia); id at 548
(Scalia concurring in the judgment, joined by Marshall and Blackmun). Scalia also rejected
selective prospectivity because he believed it violated the Court’s Article III powers. See
id at 548–49 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
82
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explicitly overruled Chevron Oil and the possibility of pure prospectivity (applying the new rule only to future facts).90 The other
three either implicity91 or explicitly92 preserved pure prospectivity for future cases, as did the three dissenting justices.93 Therefore, although a majority of justices rejected selective prospectivity, an equal number of justices preserved the possibility of
pure prospectivity.
Importantly, Justice David Souter’s opinion in Beam, which
delivered the judgment of the Court, made a new point by emphasizing the importance of treating pending (Mode 3) and future
(Mode 2) cases equally.94 His opinion held that drawing a line between the two modes would only encourage duplicative filing
“when this or any other appellate court created the possibility of
a new rule by taking a case for review.”95 Souter also pointed out
that nothing in the decision “deprive[d] respondents of their opportunity to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or
demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the nature of the remedy that must be provided.”96 Thus,
Souter’s opinion recognized the retroactivity-remedy distinction
from the plurality opinion of American Trucking.
Harper is the most important case in the retroactivity jurisprudence, as it summarizes the previous cases and clarifies the
current law.97 Harper was again a tax refund case filed after a
new rule invalidated a state tax scheme that discriminated
against federal employees.98 Justice Clarence Thomas delivered
the opinion of the Court, holding that, based on Griffith and Beam,

90 Id at 548 (Blackmun concurring in the judgment) (“Like Justice Scalia, I conclude
that prospectivity, whether ‘selective’ or ‘pure,’ breaches our obligation to discharge our
constitutional function.”).
91 Id at 545 (White concurring in the judgment) (“Nothing in the above, however, is
meant to suggest that I retreat from . . . recognizing that in proper cases a new rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively, even to the parties before the
Court.”).
92 Id at 544 (Souter) (“The grounds for our decision today are narrow. . . . We do not
speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.”).
93 See Beam, 501 US at 550 (O’Connor dissenting, joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy)
(“If the Court decides, in the context of a civil case or controversy, to change the law, it
must make the subsequent determination whether the new law or the old is to apply to
conduct occurring before the law-changing decision.”).
94 Id at 542–43 (Souter).
95 Id (Souter).
96 Id at 544 (Souter).
97 See generally Harper, 509 US 86. See also Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US
244, 278 n 32 (1994) (“[Harper and Griffith] established a firm rule of retroactivity.”).
98 Harper, 509 US at 89–91.
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[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement
of the rule.99
The Court also held that “when [it] does not reserve the question
whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it,” the
presumption is to apply the holding retroactively to them.100 This
rule “prevail[s] over any claim based on [ ] Chevron Oil,”101 and
the Supremacy Clause makes federal retroactivity doctrine supersede any “contrary approach to retroactivity under state law . . .
[in the] interpretation[ ] of federal law.”102 This decision clearly
abolished selective prospectivity for federal law.103
Scalia endorsed the Court’s approach and observed that
“[p]rospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis,”104 while four other justices preserved the possibility of pure prospectivity.105 As a result,
even after Harper, it is not entirely clear whether a full retroactivity rule absolutely excludes the possibility of pure prospectivity.
Reynoldsville Casket, the most recent Supreme Court decision on civil retroactivity, explicitly limits the full retroactivity
rule established in Harper.106 At issue was the retroactivity of a
new rule invalidating a state tolling provision that discriminated
against out-of-state defendants in tort suits.107 The Court applied
Harper and held that the new rule barred the plaintiff’s case,108
99

Id at 89, 97.
Id at 97–98 (quotation marks omitted).
101 Id at 98 (brackets omitted).
102 Harper, 509 US at 100.
103 See id at 97–98. See also id at 115 (O’Connor dissenting, joined by Rehnquist) (using the phrase “selective prospectivity” to describe what the majority abolished).
104 Id at 105 (Scalia concurring).
105 See id at 110 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined
by White) (“I remain of the view that it is sometimes appropriate in the civil context to
give only prospective application to a judicial decision. Prospective overruling allows
courts to respect the principle of stare decisis even when they are impelled to change the
law in light of new understanding.”) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). O’Connor in
her dissent cited the American Trucking plurality to support different treatments in civil and
criminal cases and Souter’s opinion in Beam to support a distinction between retroactivity
and remedy. See id at 121, 131–32 (O’Connor dissenting). The combination of these propositions leaves open the possibility of at least prospective effect of a new constitutional rule.
106 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 758–59.
107 Id at 750–51.
108 Id at 759.
100
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in total contrast to the result in Chevron Oil. Importantly, the
Court rejected a “remedial exception”109 to the retroactive application in this case because the question of remedy was not a ground
for the state supreme court’s dismissal,110 and because the reliance was the Chevron Oil-type “simple reliance.”111 Nevertheless,
the Court recognized potential remedial exceptions, in instances
in which retroactive application of the new rule might not determine the outcome of the case:
[A] court may find (1) an alternative way of curing the constitutional violation, or (2) a previously existing, independent
legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief, or (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a wellestablished general legal rule that trumps the new rule of
law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and
other significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law,
such as that of “finality” present in the Teague context, that
limits the principle of retroactivity itself.112
The Court acknowledged the existence of these remedial exceptions,113 but Scalia and Thomas concurred separately to reject any
“remedial discretion” in the application of full retroactivity.114
Since Reynoldsville Casket, various state supreme courts
have tried to interpret the Supreme Court’s new retroactivity jurisprudence. When interpreting the retroactivity of state laws,
which is not controlled by Harper and Reynoldsville Casket, some
state supreme courts have adopted the full retroactivity approach,115 while others remain loyal to the Chevron Oil test.116
When hearing federal constitutional cases, at least one state supreme court has followed the remedial exception rule articulated
in Reynoldsville Casket.117

109

Id at 754 (quotation marks omitted).
Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 753.
111 Id at 759.
112 Id.
113 Id at 758–59; id at 762 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
114 See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759–61 (Scalia concurring).
115 See, for example, MacCormack v Boston Edison Co, 672 NE2d 1, 5 (Mass 1996) (“A
constitutional decision is not a legislative act but a determination of rights enacted by the
Constitution, so that all persons with live claims are entitled to have those claims judged
according to what we conclude the Constitution demands.”).
116 See, for example, DiCenzo v A–Best Products Co, 897 NE2d 132, 140–43 (Ohio 2008)
(applying the Chevron Oil test and holding that prospective application was required).
117 See Quantum Resources Management, LLC v Pirate Lake Oil Corp, 112 S3d 209,
216–18 (La 2013) (holding that a constitutional state statute of limitations barred recovery
110
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***
In sum, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence mandates a full
retroactivity rule when overruling precedents on constitutional
grounds in both the civil and criminal contexts. The Court, however, has preserved the possibility of pure prospectivity, as well
as a number of remedial exceptions to the retroactive effect of new
constitutional rules. The next Part discusses how these rules apply to the Obergefell problem.
II. PLACING OBERGEFELL WITHIN THE SUPREME COURT’S
RETROACTIVITY JURISPRUDENCE
This Part applies the retroactivity rules to the Obergefell
problem. It suggests that, as a general principle, Obergefell applies retroactively to all four modes of cases under Harper, but
also acknowledges three theories for limiting the Harper rule in
the Obergefell context.
A.

An Obergefell Problem: Applying the Retroactivity Rules to
the Four Modes

It is time to take a fresh look at the retroactivity jurisprudence
in the context of same-sex marriage and property protection. What
do Harper and Reynoldsville Casket mean for same-sex couples legally married in recognition states before Obergefell? In addition,
what do these cases mean for third parties that transacted with
one of the spouses before June 26, 2015, and might have relied on
the old rule that they were not legally married? The answer is
clear in some cases, but still muddy in others.
The answers are clear for Mode 1 and Mode 4 cases. First, if
the underlying transaction happened after Obergefell, or if the
couple asks for government welfare or tax benefits for the period
after the decision has been rendered (Mode 1 cases), there is no
doubt that Obergefell applies. Second, for all cases that have already reached finality (Mode 4 cases), there is no retroactive application of Obergefell. Harper’s rule is limited to “all cases still
open on direct review.”118 For example, returning to the Amy and
Margaret hypothetical from the Introduction, if, before Obergefell,
Margaret challenges the transaction and loses after exhausting

from an unconstitutional tax sale, despite the fact that a new rule rendering such a sale
unconstitutional applied retroactively to the case).
118 Harper, 509 US at 97.
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all levels of direct review, courts will not reopen her case postObergefell and give back her share of the house. Here, pure retroactivity would be out of the question.
Next are the pending (Mode 3) and future (Mode 2) cases. The
underlying facts of these cases occurred before the new rule was
issued, but they differ in whether the suit is filed before (Mode 3
cases) or after (Mode 2 cases) the new rule is announced.119 After
Harper, selective prospectivity is no longer available, but pure
prospectivity remains a possibility.120
To determine whether pure prospectivity is applicable here,
it is important to determine whether the Court applied Obergefell
to the parties in that case. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court held
that same-sex couples have a “fundamental [constitutional] right
to marry” and that each state must recognize same-sex marriages
approved by other states.121 Importantly, the Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit’s holding to the contrary and did not reserve the
question whether its holding applied to the litigants before it.122
Under these circumstances, the normal presumption is that the
new rule applies retroactively to all pending cases.123 Harper commands a full retroactive application to all cases pending and yet
to be filed, “regardless of whether [the underlying] events predate
or postdate [the Court’s] announcement of the rule.”124 Pure prospectivity is thus not an option under the Obergefell regime.
Does that mean that Mark (the buyer of Amy and Margaret’s
home), Pat (David’s mother and the beneficiary of his estate’s
wrongful death action), and all those similarly situated have no
protection for their property interests? Specifically, is there any
limit, constitutional or otherwise, to the general rule of full retroactivity? The next Section proposes three theories for limiting the
retroactivity of Obergefell and protecting reliance interests.

119 Justice Souter’s opinion in Beam declined to draw a line between pending cases
and cases yet to be filed, rendering the treatment of both types of cases the same in terms
of retroactivity. See text accompanying notes 94–96.
120 See notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
121 Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2604–05, 2607–08.
122 See id at 2608.
123 See Harper, 509 US at 97–98.
124 Id at 97.
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Three Theories for Limiting the Retroactivity of Obergefell

It is worth emphasizing that the stakes are high and the disruptive effects great if there is no limitation to the full retroactivity rule. It would mean that (1) the otherwise-settled validity of
numerous past transactions would be open to question (Mark’s
case), (2) the otherwise-clear property distribution by the operation of law would become uncertain (Pat’s case), and (3) welfare
and tax programs would expect extra burdens and costs that are
not already allocated in government fiscal plans.
The issue of retroactivity requires a balancing of several policy considerations. Fairness requires, on the one hand, protecting
good-faith reliance (counseling in favor of nonretroactivity) and,
on the other, providing equal treatment of similarly situated individuals (suggesting the rejection of selective prospectivity).125
Stare decisis demands, on the one hand, retroactivity to increase
the cost of judicial activism and, on the other, nonretroactivity to
protect reliance on precedents.126 Finality and efficiency (administrative burden concerns) militate against opening closed cases,
and thus suggest that pure retroactivity should be rejected.127 The
conflicting nature of these considerations makes it impossible to
have a straightforward retroactivity or nonretroactivity rule
without exception, as demonstrated by Reynoldsville Casket’s
careful carving out of specific remedial exceptions. The difficult
question is how to strike the balance.
There are three theories for limiting the Harper rule in the
Obergefell context. First, Reynoldsville Casket itself provides four
categories for limiting the retroactive effect of a constitutional
overruling (the “Remedial Exceptions Theory”). Second, viewed
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s vacillating retroactivity jurisprudence, Obergefell can be distinguished from Harper
and Reynoldsville Casket and analogized to Linkletter and the
Warren Court’s nonretroactivity norm, because Obergefell created (or discovered)128 an implied fundamental right (the “Warren
Court Theory”). Third, the constitutional protection of property

125 See Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and
Stare Decisis, 48 Syracuse L Rev 1515, 1560–61 (1998).
126 See id at 1565–67.
127 See id at 1567–68.
128 Whether “created” or “discovered” is the appropriate term depends on whether one
is an Austinian or a Blackstonian.
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rights also provides some limits to the general rule of full retroactivity when vested property rights and legitimate third-party reliance interests are at risk (the “Constitutional Limits Theory”).
The Warren Court Theory gives the strongest protection to
third-party reliance because it argues that the Harper line of cases
is not applicable at all to Obergefell’s implied-fundamental-rights
context. The Constitutional Limits Theory recognizes the applicability of Harper to the Obergefell context in general, but would argue for refusing to apply the full retroactivity rule to Obergefell
problems involving constitutionally protected property interests.
The Remedial Exceptions Theory provides the weakest limit to the
Harper rule, because it argues that there is no constitutional limit
to full retroactivity and that the retroactive effects of Obergefell
should be barred only in certain particularized situations.
This Comment argues that only the Remedial Exceptions
Theory, which provides the narrowest protection for the reliance
interests in property cases, is viable under current Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Part III proposes a framework for limiting
the retroactive effects of Obergefell in property cases based on the
four nonconstitutional remedial exceptions in Reynoldsville Casket. It then rebuts the Warren Court Theory and the Constitutional Limits Theory.
The Comment concludes that Obergefell retroactively applies
to all pending and future property cases, even if the relevant transaction took place before Obergefell, with three exceptions: (1) when
government agencies refuse to give the requested benefits to all
married couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, (2) when such
application is barred by the operation of a preexisting, independent
law that is itself constitutional and has nothing to do with retroactivity, and (3) when there is a disruption of important reliance interests coupled with significant policy justifications.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING THE RETROACTIVE EFFECTS OF
OBERGEFELL IN PROPERTY CASES: NONCONSTITUTIONAL
REMEDIAL EXCEPTIONS
The Remedial Exceptions Theory is based on the four exceptions in Reynoldsville Casket. These exceptions provide a framework to balance the interests protected by the full retroactivity
rule and the reliance interests of numerous third parties, public
and private. To reiterate, Reynoldsville Casket’s four explicit exceptions to the full retroactive effect of a new rule are as follows:
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(1) when the cure for unconstitutionality does not require retroactive application of the new rule; (2) when there is “a previously existing, independent legal basis” for denying retroactive
effect that is not itself unconstitutional; (3) when there is a
“well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of
law, . . . reflect[ing] both reliance interests and other significant
policy justifications”; or (4) when “a principle of law, such as that
of ‘finality’ present in the Teague context, [ ] limits the principle
of retroactivity itself.”129
This Part focuses on the difficult pending and future cases
(Mode 2 and 3 cases, respectively). The fourth exception is concerned only with closed cases (Mode 4 cases), which are clearly
barred from being reopened by the retroactive application of
Obergefell. As such, the rest of Part III establishes a framework
based on the first three exceptions under the Remedial Exceptions Theory, and then rejects the Warren Court Theory and the
Constitutional Limits Theory.
A.

Alternative Cures for Unconstitutionality

One remedial exception to the full retroactivity rule applies
when there is an alternative way to remedy the unconstitutionality of the old rule. This exception might save government agencies
from the unexpected extra fiscal burdens caused by the retroactive application of Obergefell. In Reynoldsville Casket, the plaintiff pointed out some “tax cases in which the Court applied retroactively new rules holding certain state tax laws
unconstitutional, but nonetheless permitted the state courts a degree of leeway in designing a remedy,” including remedies that
would deny refunds.130 The majority distinguished Reynoldsville
Casket from the previous tax cases: the cited cases involved “a
particular kind of constitutional violation” that “depends, in critical part, upon differential treatment of two similar classes of individuals.”131 Under such circumstances, the court “might cure the
problem either by similarly burdening, or by similarly unburdening, both groups.”132 In Reynoldsville Casket, however, the Ohio

129
130
131
132

Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759 (emphasis omitted).
Id at 755, citing generally Harper, 509 US 86, and Beam, 501 US 529.
Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 755.
Id.
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Supreme Court’s remedy under review did not cure the constitutional problem by equalizing the treatment of in-state and out-ofstate defendants and thus did not fall under this exception.133
In Swisher International, Inc v United States,134 the United
States Court of International Trade135 used the flexibility of the
remedy for unconstitutional tax statutes recognized in Reynoldsville Casket to find that “an unconstitutional tax is [not] an ipso
facto taking.”136 The Court of International Trade reasoned that if
it were, “the remedy would be limited to just compensation, and
[the problem] could not . . . be cured by the levy of additional
taxes.”137 This attests to the point that retroactive application of a
new rule does not necessarily result in a single type of remedy.
The flexibility of the remedy even in the presence of retroactivity is not limited to tax cases. In Reynoldsville Casket, the
Court extended the principle to the statute of limitations context.
Suppose a state statute of limitations discriminates against outof-state defendants by allowing a longer period for plaintiffs to
bring a tort suit against them. The unequal treatment can be
cured either by requiring the same longer period for both out-ofstate and in-state defendants or by requiring the same shorter
period for both groups.138
Applying the alternative-cures exception to the Obergefell
scenarios, there is an argument for curing the unconstitutionality
of same-sex marriage bans and nonrecognition without applying
Obergefell retroactively. The alternative-cures exception is especially applicable to cases concerning property interests related to
marital status (rather than the right to marry itself). It is true
that the bulk of the Obergefell majority opinion relied on the implied fundamental rights of individuals under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause,139 but the opinion also rested
on the Equal Protection Clause.140 Violating one does not necessarily violate the other. Imagine that a state recognizes the right
133

See id at 756.
178 F Supp 2d 1354 (Intl Trade 2001).
135 The Court of International Trade is an Article III court that primarily hears cases
on imports and federal transactions that impact international trade. The court’s decisions
can be appealed to the Federal Circuit. See About the Court (United States Court of International Trade, Dec 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3CGE-5JEP.
136 Swisher International, 178 F Supp 2d at 1363.
137 Id.
138 See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 756.
139 See Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2604–05.
140 Id at 2604 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is
a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
134
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of same-sex couples to marry, while also discriminating against
same-sex married couples by refusing to grant them certain tax
exemptions available to opposite-sex married couples. The state
action does not violate the implied fundamental right to marry,
but may very well be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.141
In cases in which property interests alone (and not the right
to marry) are involved, the retroactive application of Obergefell
does not necessarily mean that same-sex couples who are now in
court or intend to file cases will obtain their desired remedy,
namely, the benefits that opposite-sex couples currently enjoy.
Applying the alternative-cures exception to the Obergefell context, one can argue that the unconstitutionality of any discriminatory statute or state action can be cured by equalizing the treatment given to same-sex couples and opposite-sex ones. For
example, the IRS could decide that married couples, of the opposite or same sex, cannot get certain benefits anymore, even for the
period that has already started, or Congress could pass a statute
to the same effect.142 Given the Court’s permissive attitude toward
legislative retroactivity over economic matters,143 rectification of
rights will probably come through the democratic process and not
through the judiciary. In other words, there is probably no constitutional or legal duty for welfare or benefits agencies to give full
retroactive effect to Obergefell to the satisfaction of same-sex couples legally married in recognition states prior to Obergefell.
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
141 See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co v County Commission of Webster County, West
Virginia, 488 US 336, 345–46 (1989) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause “protects
the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by
subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class”).
142 In this hypothetical, there are no exit options for opposite-sex couples if they are
denied benefits just as same-sex couples; there is no de facto segregation in treatment
because the deprivation of benefits would be uniform across the nation. This situation is
distinguishable from Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US 218
(1964). In Griffin, the Court held that it was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause for one county in a state to close all public schools, depriving both white and black
students of the opportunity to attend the schools. Id at 225. The Court acknowledged that,
as a matter of state law, the county could close all public schools, but found that there was
still a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This was because the de facto private school
segregation in the county would force children there to choose between segregated private
school or no school at all, while children in other counties did not have to face such a choice.
Id at 229–31.
143 See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and Unrealized Potential of State
Constitutions, 14 Nev L J 63, 66–78 (2013).
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The cases of Mark and Pat may be different from welfare or
benefits cases. The property interests of Mark and Pat rest directly on whether the same-sex couple in each case was married
at the time of the relevant event (Mark’s purchase of Amy’s house
or David’s death), that is, whether Obergefell is retroactively applied or not. There seems to be no cure other than acknowledging
their marital status at the time of the relevant transaction. In
other words, there is no alternative cure for unconstitutionality
in situations that involve only private parties and no state actors.
The asymmetry here is worrisome. For one thing, nonexpert
individuals may be less capable of anticipating judicial changes
than government agencies are and may have fewer obligations to
do so. It is thus more reasonable for private parties to rely on old
rules. The analysis above, however, shows that it is possible for
the government to avoid the retroactive effect of Obergefell, but
the same is not true of private third parties. The result is ironic:
the exception helps the types of parties who are best able to anticipate changes in law, and burdens those who are not.
It is also worrisome for another reason: if a government
agency decides not to give certain benefits to same-sex married
couples based on their past marital status, it must deny oppositesex couples’ past benefits as well. Withdrawing previously given
benefits may create great political pressure, making it a less
likely outcome. In contrast, if the agency decides to give benefits
in the future to all married couples, including those married before Obergefell, the previously married same-sex couples can still
enjoy the benefits as a result of their now-recognized marital status. In other words, same-sex couples face very few realistic possibilities of harm whichever way the government agency tries to
cure the unconstitutionality. By contrast, private third parties
may be unfairly deprived of otherwise vested property interests
simply because of reasonable reliance on the old rule of nonrecognition, and may have no remedy whatsoever, if Obergefell applies
with retroactive effect.144
In sum, the alternative-cures remedial exception is available
only to relieve government agencies’ fiscal burden when there is
a prior violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and only at the
cost of great political pressure. It cannot be used to protect private
144 For Justice O’Connor’s analogous reasoning in American Trucking, see text accompanying notes 83–84 (arguing for a rule of retroactivity only for criminal cases, because
criminal convictions can be remedied only through retroactivity, while civil defendants can
obtain some remedy even under a prospective rule).
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third parties who relied on the old nonrecognition rule. The asymmetry is troublesome because the reliance of private third parties
is more reasonable than the reliance of government agencies and
because, unlike the same-sex couples, the private third parties
will inevitably be hurt.
B.

Preexisting and Independent State Law Grounds

There is a second exception to the general rule of full retroactivity established in Reynoldsville Casket. If there is “a [constitutional,] previously existing, independent legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief,” that independent
legal rule deprives the new rule of retroactive effect.145 For example, the DC Court of Appeals held that a new rule for Title VII
equal pay cases established by the Supreme Court was effectively
not retroactively applicable (that is, it was not outcome determinative) because the statute of limitations barred the claim.146
In a case concerning the retroactive effect of Windsor on Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974147 (ERISA) claims,
the defendant-employer tried to avoid the retroactive application
of Windsor.148 The employer argued that “a previously existing independent legal basis for denying relief” existed because the
same-sex couple’s marriage was not legally valid in any jurisdiction at the time of the plaintiff’s wife’s death.149 The district court
found that, although California did not recognize same-sex marriages at the time the couple married, the couple was legally married under California law as it existed at the time the case came
before the court.150 The district court still found the marriage valid
because, while it would have been impossible for them to acquire
a marriage license, the couple had “complied with every other requirement imposed by California law.”151 The court simply noted
that an inability to obtain a marriage license was a “curable defect” given the development of California law regarding same-sex
marriage.152 In other words, the court left open the possibility that
if the defect was not “curable” under a nonrecognition state law
145

Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 756–57, 759.
George Washington University v Violand, 932 A2d 1109, 1118–19 (DC 2007), citing
Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 752, 758–59.
147 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
148 Schuett v FedEx Corp, 119 F Supp 3d 1155, 1163–64 (ND Cal 2016).
149 Id at 1164–65.
150 Id at 1160–61, 1166.
151 Id at 1161.
152 Schuett, 119 F Supp 3d at 1161.
146
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that was still constitutional at the time of the case, this could be
“a previously existing, independent legal basis (having nothing to
do with retroactivity) for denying relief.”153
The private third parties who have no remedies under the
alternative-cures remedial exception might have an argument
under the preexisting and independent law remedial exception.
For example, Pat could argue that, at the time of her son’s death,
he and Paul were not legally married under Alabama law and
that the Alabama nonrecognition rule fits the independent state
law exception. As a result, Obergefell cannot be effectively applied
retroactively. Mark could advance a similar argument: at the
time of the sale of the house, Amy and Margaret were not legally
married under Texas law, and that operates as a preexisting, independent state law ground barring the retroactive effect of
Obergefell. The problem for both Pat and Mark is that the independent state law itself has to be constitutional, and the nonrecognition rule is not—the plaintiff in Reynoldsville Casket was denied relief because her claim to an exception was based on a
statute of limitations that was itself unconstitutional.154
In her brief, Pat emphasized the Alabama early vesting rule:
“There exists a profound demonstration of precedent from Alabama
courts illistrating [sic] the principle that the law in effect at the time
of decedent’s death controls the distribution of his property in
Alabama.”155 This rule, she argued, “serve[s] as ‘a previously existing, independent legal basis . . . for denying relief.’”156 Paul’s
appellate brief emphasized instead the aspect of Alabama intestacy law (which governed distribution in the case) that defined
David’s heirs as including both the surviving spouse and the
mother, without further definition of either term.157 The retroactive application of Obergefell clarified only that David had a surviving spouse when he died, without disturbing the state intestacy rule effective at his death.158 According to Paul, then, the

153

Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759.
See id at 757 (“[T]he Ohio Supreme Court did not rest its holding upon a preexisting, separate rule of state law. . . . Rather, the maintenance of [the] action critically
depends upon the continued application of the Ohio statute’s ‘tolling’ principle—a principle that this Court has held unconstitutional.”).
155 Fancher Brief at *24 (cited in note 19).
156 Id at *27–28, citing Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759.
157 Brief of Appellee, Hard v Fancher, No 15-13836, *30, 33 (11th Cir filed Nov 5,
2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 6854333) (“Hard Brief” ).
158 Id at *30–32.
154
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state intestacy rule did not operate as a previously existing, independent legal basis for denying relief.159 The briefs’ arguments
seemed to suggest that the outcome of the case would eventually
rest on the interpretation of the relevant Alabama state law, over
which the Supreme Court of Alabama has the ultimate authority.160
There was a possibility, however, that even if Pat’s interpretation was correct, the Alabama early vesting rule would not have
qualified under this exception. The early vesting rule essentially
dictates a temporal choice of law and, therefore, is not a rule “having nothing to do with retroactivity.”161 In other words, even if the
Eleventh Circuit had decided the case on retroactivity grounds,
rather than on mootness grounds,162 Pat might still have lost. In
terms of protecting reliance interests and reasonable expectations, this might not have been an entirely unfair result. After all,
David’s death was a sudden and tragic accident, and Pat had little
reliance interest in the proceeds of the wrongful death action.163
Arguably, Mark, the buyer of a same-sex couple’s homestead, would have a more significant reliance interest than Pat
had. Yet it is unclear that the preexisting state legal ground exception would fare any better for him than for Pat. The Court
hinted in Reynoldsville Casket that a qualified rule under this
exception could be “a rule containing certain procedural requirements for any [similar] suit.”164 As illustrated above, a potential
rule also has to be constitutional, and therefore cannot be the
marriage nonrecognition rule. And it has to be independent, that
is, “having nothing to do with retroactivity,”165 and therefore cannot be any rule that freezes parties’ property rights under state
law at a particular moment. Apart from a statute of limitations,
which is explicitly listed as a qualified rule under this exception
in Reynoldsville Casket,166 it is difficult to imagine another rule
that would be generally applicable to a typical property transaction like Mark’s.

159

Id at *33, citing Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759.
See Pacific Gas & Electric Co v Police Court of City of Sacramento, California, 251
US 22, 24–25 (1919) (“[This] is a question of purely state law which we may not review.”).
161 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 757.
162 Hard, 2016 WL 1579015 at *3–4.
163 See Hard Brief at *32–33 (cited in note 157).
164 See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 756 (emphasis added).
165 Id at 757.
166 Id at 756–57.
160
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In sum, although the preexisting legal ground exception looks
promising at first as a means of protecting private parties’ varying degrees of reliance interests,167 its scope turns out to be extremely narrow. It only clearly embraces statutes of limitations
and other generally applicable procedural barriers to bringing a
suit. Besides, a qualified rule under this exception must be both
constitutional and independent in the sense that it does not implicate retroactivity, therefore disqualifying any nonrecognition
rule for same-sex marriages and any temporal choice-of-law rules
in state law. Lastly, even when such a rule exists, the ultimate
success of an argument relying on the rule will likely depend on
the state supreme court’s interpretation of state law.
C.

Well-Established General Legal Rules Reflecting Reliance
Interests and Significant Policy Justifications

In an oft-quoted168 paragraph from his concurring opinion in
Reynoldsville Casket, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that he and
Justice O’Connor “[did] not read [Reynoldsville Casket] to surrender in advance [the] authority to decide that in some exceptional
cases, courts may shape relief in light of disruption of important
reliance interests or the unfairness caused by unexpected judicial
decisions.”169 The Second Circuit,170 a dissenting opinion in the
Ninth Circuit,171 the Supreme Court of Alabama,172 and the DC
Court of Appeals173 have all suggested that Reynoldsville Casket
leaves open this possibility.

167 Compare Mark’s case (a private transaction) with Pat’s (a property distribution
resulting from the operation of state law).
168 See, for example, Meir Katz, Note, Plainly Not “Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity
on Direct Review, 25 Cardozo L Rev 1979, 1993 n 79 (2004); Brooke J. Egan, DeffenbaughWilliams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: Title VII Punitive Damages after the Retroactivity Doctrine, 74 Tulane L Rev 1557, 1559 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change:
An Equilibrium Approach, 110 Harv L Rev 1055, 1094 n 225 (1997).
169 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 761 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
170 Margo v Weiss, 213 F3d 55, 60 n 2 (2d Cir 2000).
171 United States v City of Tacoma, Washington, 332 F3d 574, 583 (9th Cir 2003)
(Ferguson dissenting) (“In particular, I believe that the presence of the following factors
prohibits full retroactive application . . . in this case: (1) the presence of a novel decision
regarding the statute, such that the City of Tacoma can claim ‘justifiable reliance’ on its
earlier interpretation of the statute . . . .”).
172 South Central Bell Telephone Co v State, 789 S2d 147, 151 n 10 (Ala 2000).
173 Davis v Moore, 772 A2d 204, 232 (DC 2001) (“Appellants are correct that the Supreme Court has left the door open to the possibility that it might declare a new rule of law
to be purely prospective in effect even if it is not required by the Constitution to do so.”).
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On the other hand, Reynoldsville Casket itself emphasized
that the Chevron Oil type of “simple reliance” is never enough.174
A later Supreme Court case additionally affirmed that only “grave
disruption or inequity” can justify invoking the reliance exception.175 One example of a well-established general legal rule that
qualifies under the reliance and policy justification exception is
the qualified immunity rule.176 In civil suits against government
officials, the qualified immunity rule bars the retroactive application of a new rule holding a type of police action unconstitutional
when “the new rule of law was not clearly established at the time
of the [action].”177 It does so to protect the police from civil liability
for violating individuals’ constitutional rights. The qualified immunity rule is justified on two significant policy grounds. First, it
is necessary “lest threat of liability dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in
the unflinching discharge of their duties.”178 Second, “it reflects
the concern that society as a whole, without that immunity, would
have to bear the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”179
It is clear that the kind of reliance sufficient for qualified immunity is not the same kind of reliance sufficient for invoking the
Reynoldsville Casket reliance exception. The reliance sufficient
for qualified immunity is simpler than the Chevron Oil type, in
the sense that proving the former is much easier than proving the
latter: the former does not require more than a circuit split on a
particular legal issue in a § 1983 action,180 while the latter involves reliance on a well-established rule.181 The example of qualified immunity instead indicates that in order to qualify for the
174

Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759.
Ryder v United States, 515 US 177, 184–85 (1995).
176 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 757–58. For a general discussion of qualified immunity
in the context of gun control and § 1983 claims against municipalities and state officials, see
Lewis M. Wasserman, Gun Control on College and University Campuses in the Wake of District
of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 Va J Soc Pol & L 1, 48–55 (2011).
177 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 757 (quotation marks omitted).
178 Id at 757–58 (quotation marks omitted and brackets in original).
179 Id at 758 (quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). See also South Central Bell
Telephone, 789 S2d at 151 (noting Reynoldsville Casket’s requirement of “‘significant policy
justifications’ . . . where burdens would fall on ‘society as a whole’ if the rule were otherwise”).
180 Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603, 618 (1999) (“If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side
of the controversy.”).
181 In Chevron Oil, the plaintiff relied on the well-established admiralty laches doctrine, and did not invoke any significant policy justification beyond that. See note 66 and
175
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Reynoldsville Casket exception, there must be some “significant
policy justifications” beyond “reliance interests” (meaning the
Chevron Oil type of “simple reliance”).182 Additionally, those justifications must affect the “society as a whole” in important aspects, such as by affecting the incentives to become responsible
public officials.183
Apart from qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court
in Reynoldsville Casket did not give another example under this
exception,184 leaving one to wonder what else qualifies as “a wellestablished general legal rule that . . . reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy justifications.”185 In a closely
analogous area, retroactive zoning regulation, there is one such
candidate, the vested rights doctrine.186 “In its most general form,
the vested rights doctrine defines when, and under what circumstances, an incomplete project can count as an existing use.”187
The doctrine “assumes that if a right has vested . . . it is entitled
to protection from the subsequently enacted land use regulations.”188 The majority rule in the states is a late vesting rule,
whereby courts use a multifactor test to determine whether “the
owner has made substantial expenditures in good faith reliance
on the issuance of a building permit or other approval.”189 Some
states use a minority “per se rule”190 that “the [development] right
vests when the party . . . applies for [a] building permit, if that
permit is thereafter issued.”191
Whichever vesting rule states have chosen in their common
law, the same significant policy consideration underlies them:
protecting reasonable expectations backed by some degree of
quantifiable investment. Obviously, such a rule will protect the
incentives for land and property development and transactions,
accompanying text. This is the kind of “simple reliance” to which Reynoldsville Casket
referred.
182 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759.
183 Id at 758.
184 See id at 757–58.
185 Id at 759 (emphasis omitted).
186 For a comparison of the vested rights doctrine and the estoppel doctrine in zoning,
see Simon J. Elkharrat, Note, But It Wasn’t My Fault! The Scope of the Zoning Estoppel
Doctrine, 34 Cardozo L Rev 1999, 2004–16 (2013).
187 Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
NYU L Rev 1222, 1238 (2009).
188 Id.
189 Robert C. Ellickson, et al, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials 216 (Aspen 4th
ed 2013) (citations omitted).
190 Id at 216–17.
191 Hull v Hunt, 331 P2d 856, 859 (Wash 1958) (en banc).
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which have a significant impact on the “society as a whole.”192
Even in an area such as zoning, in which balancing “the need for
certainty [and] the need for change” is essential,193 “[t]here is . . .
a strong background rule running throughout the law of property
that existing uses are entitled to protection from the government.”194 In the context of pre-Obergefell property transactions,
the policy argument is even stronger. After all, a title to land
based on a covenant valid at the time of transaction is the archetypal vested right; there are simply no further application steps
or “substantial expenditures” to engage in.195 Besides, the need for
flexibility in land planning is nonexistent in the Obergefell context. The vested rights doctrine qualifies as “a well-established
general legal rule that . . . reflects both reliance interests and
other significant policy justifications.”196
Given the inapplicability of the former two remedial exceptions to the typical property transaction scenario, this final remedial exception seems to be Mark’s last hope for protecting his reliance interest.197 Granted, if Mark’s argument is only that he
relied on the then-valid state law of nonrecognition when entering
the purchase contract and, as a result, did not ask for consent
from Margaret, he will not succeed. This is so even if he will be
evicted from his home! Reasonable reliance on existing law plus
grave individual suffering without resort to any remedy is exactly
the kind of simple reliance Reynoldsville Casket rejected.
The vested rights doctrine, however, strongly supports protecting Mark’s vested title. Apart from the reasons illustrated
above, the vested rights doctrine applies even more forcefully here
192 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 758. See also, for example, Gershon Feder and
David Feeny, Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development
Policy, 5 World Bank Econ Rev 135, 135–36 (1991) (arguing that “land rights systems
[have great impact] on incentives, uncertainty, and the operation of credit markets” and
“property rights in land affect resource allocation in agriculture in developing countries”).
193 Ellickson, et al, Land Use Controls at 216 (cited in note 189).
194 Serkin, 84 NYU L Rev at 1224 (cited in note 187) (observing that there is such a
rule in current law, but arguing that there is no constitutional support for the rule and
that existing uses in the land regulation context are overprotected). For an argument supporting the position that there is no constitutional protection for existing property rights
in the context of retroactive application of Obergefell, see Part III.D.2.
195 Ellickson, et al, Land Use Controls at 216 (cited in note 189).
196 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 759 (emphasis omitted).
197 The reliance and policy justification exception seems inapplicable to Pat’s case,
because she had barely any reliance interest. See text accompanying note 163. But it is
possible that in other intestacy cases, in which property distributions result from the automatic operation of well-established state laws, there are sufficient reliance interests and
significant policy justifications to qualify under this exception.
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than in the land use context because of two other strong policy
arguments beyond simple reliance. These policy arguments further
justify applying the reliance exception to good-faith third parties
like Mark in private property transactions before Obergefell. For
one thing, depriving Mark of his title may increase transaction
costs in real estate deals, especially those involving same-sex couples. That is, interested buyers may need to research the gender
and marital status of the past owners. Arguably, the bona fide
real-estate purchaser rule in force in some states198 may accelerate the title-cleansing process, but there still may be more transaction costs. It is simply incorrect to argue that Obergefell settles
the same-sex marriage issue once and for all and that future buyers will no longer have to exert more caution when dealing with
same-sex couples living together.
Perhaps an even more significant policy concern in the long
run is that transacting parties will constantly remain alert that
the deal may be subject to voidance in the future by a new Supreme Court opinion. Disturbing past reliance interests in real
property through retroactive application of a new rule will forever
put society as a whole on alert. The creation or discovery of implied fundamental rights is still ongoing,199 and the risk of future
forfeiture of acquired property is greater given the lack of constitutional protection against retroactive judicial lawmaking affecting property interests.200
In conclusion, the third parties in pre-Obergefell property
transactions who relied on the old nonrecognition rule should not

198

See, for example, 765 ILCS 5/30:

All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing which are authorized to
be recorded, shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of filing the
same for record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers,
without notice; and all such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to
all such creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice, until the same
shall be filed for record.
199 For examples of two opposite views of the possible future development of “fundamental rights” in marriage, compare William Baude, Is Polygamy Next? (NY Times, July
21, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/opinion/is-polygamy-next.html
(visited Jan 15, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (arguing that the logic of Obergefell
suggests that there may be a fundamental right to polygamy, just like same-sex marriage),
with Michael Cobb, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club (NY Times, June 30, 2015),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-lonely-hearts
-club.html (visited May 2, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (questioning why single people’s “dignity” does not justify their enjoyment of the same benefits—in health care, taxes,
and estate planning—that married people enjoy).
200 For further discussion of this point, see Part III.D.2.
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be subject to the retroactive effect of Obergefell. They are protected by the vested rights doctrine under the reliance and policy
justification remedial exception.
D. The Unavailability of Greater Protection: Refuting Two
Theories
The analysis above shows that while the Remedial Exceptions Theory succeeds in providing a framework for limiting the
retroactive effects of Obergefell in each of the three types of property cases, the limitation provided is quite narrow. The impliedfundamental-rights nature of Obergefell and the perceived notion
of property protection at a constitutional level may naturally lead
one instead toward the Warren Court Theory and the Constitutional Limits Theory. These two theories both provide greater
protection for reliance interests than the Remedial Exceptions
Theory. The rest of this Section shows that neither is viable under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, making the Remedial
Exceptions Theory the only option for limiting the retroactive effect of Obergefell in property cases.
1. Implied fundamental rights and the Warren Court
Theory.
The development of the retroactivity doctrine from Linkletter
to Reynoldsville Casket tempts one to hypothesize that, in eras of
explicit judicial activism and progressive expansion of rights,
judges may be more willing to acknowledge that they are actually
making laws.201 During these periods, the technique of nonretroactivity is useful to protect reliance interests and to avoid administrative costs that may prove to be overwhelmingly burdensome.
Once the dust settles, however, courts may revert to the tradition
of retroactivity, which promotes fairness and consistency, especially in constitutional law. After all, if a previous violation is of a
constitutional nature, it seems unfair and inconsistent to deny relief to some of those harmed by the violation, while vindicating
others.
Obergefell can be distinguished from the Court’s retroactivity
jurisprudence of the past five decades in one important respect: it

201 See, for example, Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2595–98 (documenting the changing definition of marriage in society and arguing that the law should keep up with social and
cultural change).
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is a case based primarily on implied fundamental rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,202 while the previous civil cases concerned either statutes
of limitations (Chevron Oil and Reynoldsville Casket) or tax refunds (American Trucking, Beam, and Harper).203 Marriage is a
status to which a great variety of rights and obligations are attached,204 and the examples in the Introduction showcase several
of the “myriad circumstances in which the question [of retroactivity] might arise.”205
As O’Connor observed in Beam, “the broader the potential
reach of a new rule, the greater the potential disruption of settled
expectations.”206 While retroactive application to tax refund and
statute of limitations cases may have a defined scope of disruptive
effects (generally limited to the parties in the cases), retroactive
application of Obergefell may disturb justified expectations of
countless third parties. Such a great disruption caused by announcing new individual rights is familiar—the Warren Court era
of expansion of criminal procedural rights, with the ensuing anxiety over the possibility of numerous legal prison breaks, is quite
similar.207 The Court in Linkletter resorted to nonretroactivity
techniques to avoid such a significant disruption.
From the perspective of legal realism, it is not unfathomable
that the justices today would repeat their predecessors’ choices.
Liberal justices have an incentive to keep a low-key attitude toward the application of such a groundbreaking decision to avoid
strengthening its divisive effect, while conservative justices desire to do damage control for a decision that they do not like.208 If
one looks at the voting split in the previous retroactivity cases
and the composition of the Court today, this possibility may seem
even more plausible: at least three justices (Kennedy, Justice
Stephen Breyer, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) would likely
be in favor of some leeway in the full retroactivity rule, as shown
in the majority opinion of Reynoldsville Casket.209 The situation is

202

See id at 2604–05.
See Part I.C.
204 See, for example, Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2683 (observing that the marriage definition in DOMA “control[led] over 1,000 federal laws in which marital or spousal status is
addressed as a matter of federal law”).
205 Reynoldsville Casket, 514 US at 761 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
206 Beam, 501 US at 552 (O’Connor dissenting).
207 See Part I.B.
208 See text accompanying note 41.
209 See text accompanying notes 106–12.
203
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complicated in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, but arguably
with one or two more votes, the silent return of Linkletter and
Chevron Oil may be possible, even if the return is limited to
Obergefell and future cases that involve the announcement of an
implied fundamental right.
The analogy to the Warren Court era, however, is ultimately
not viable. First of all, in Loving v Virginia,210 a scenario very similar to the Obergefell problem, the new rule of allowing interracial
marriage was applied retroactively to set aside convictions under
miscegenation laws even on collateral attack.211 This is significant
given that this case was decided in the Warren Court era and after Linkletter was newly minted—in other words, when the Court
was embracing the possibility of nonretroactivity. As Justice
Harlan argued in his Mackey v United States212 opinion, it is precisely because a new rule announces substantive due process
rights that it should be given full retroactive effect to redress previous grave deprivations of fundamental constitutional rights.213
Second, analogizing the current situation to the Warren
Court era blurs the line between criminal and civil cases and may
in fact support retroactivity. Griffith reversed Linkletter because
the policy considerations leaned toward individual liberty and
away from governmental reliance interests.214 A similar respect
for fundamental individual liberty should therefore favor retroactive application of Obergefell. Moreover, in many cases, the remedy that the same-sex spouse seeks (such as being listed on the
deceased partner’s death certificate, like in Obergefell itself) can
be fulfilled only by retroactive acknowledgement of the same-sex
marriage. It is analogous to the criminal context, in which the

210 388 US 1 (1967). This Comment’s discussion of Loving is limited to the context of
retroactivity of newly created implied fundamental rights in general. It does not touch on
Loving’s reliance interest scenario, which is closely analogous to the Obergefell problem
discussed in this Comment, for lack of relevant documented case law.
211 See Loving, 388 US at 12 (vacating the Lovings’ convictions); Mackey v United
States, 401 US 667, 692 & n 7 (1971) (Harlan concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
212 401 US 667 (1971).
213 See id at 692 (Harlan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(“New ‘substantive due process’ rules, that is, those that place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, must, in my view, be placed on a
different footing.”) (citation omitted).
214 See text accompanying notes 83–84.

05 CHEN_CMT_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE)

1452

The University of Chicago Law Review

9/20/2016 2:04 PM

[83:1417

only remedies the defendant or petitioner seeks are release from
prison and retroactive nullification of the conviction.215
Finally, even from the perspective of legal realism, this situation is not entirely analogous to the Warren Court dynamic. The
current Court is not looking forward to creating a series of fundamental rights in the same area,216 and thus the incentive either to
remain low-key or to control damage may not be as strong as in
the Warren Court era. The Warren Court Theory, which may provide the most limits to the retroactivity of Obergefell, is not viable.
2. The Constitutional Limits Theory: Constitutional limits
to retroactive judicial deprivation of property interests.
Even if the Harper rule applies to implied-fundamentalrights cases in general, there may still be constitutional barriers
to its application in cases that disturb established property rights.
The Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, makes it
almost impossible to strike down retroactive civil, economic legislation using rational basis review.217 It is not entirely clear
whether the usual constitutional weapons to protect property interests, such as the Contract Clause,218 the Due Process Clause,219
and the Takings Clause,220 may operate to withhold adjudicative
retroactivity in property cases. These provisions are perhaps not
very effective.
First of all, the Contract Clause “received a near-fatal blow”
in Home Building & Loan Association v Blaisdell,221 “a controversial decision which upheld a temporary moratorium on the foreclosure of mortgages.”222 One scholar described that case as having

215

See text accompanying notes 83–84.
Arguably, the next step might be the right to marry, for example, between first
cousins or among more than two people. See, for example, Baude, Is Polygamy Next? (cited
in note 199). But it is certainly different from the Warren Court’s expansion of a series of
rights that were of parallel importance and controversy. The barrier to expansion here is
obviously much higher: gay marriage is perceived as considerably more different from polygamy than the right to free counsel is relative to the right to be informed of rights before
custodial interrogation.
217 See generally Usman, 14 Nev L J at 63 (cited in note 143) (examining and rejecting
the federal constitutional clauses as a possible restriction on retroactive civil legislation
and proposing restrictions based on state constitutions).
218 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1.
219 US Const Amend V; US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
220 US Const Amend V.
221 290 US 398 (1934).
222 James W. Ely Jr, The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two Constitutional Provisions, 1 NYU J L & Liberty 370, 381 (2005).
216
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“the effect of virtually gutting the Contract Clause.”223 The Clause
has not been revived since, against the background of “the triumph of New Deal constitutionalism and the emergence of the regulatory state,” which symbolized the Supreme Court’s retreat from
being a rigid guardian of private property against government regulation.224 In any event, “[t]he Supreme Court has . . . consistently
refus[ed] to [read the Clause to] constrain judicial decisions undermining contractual expectations.”225
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment seems a bit
more promising. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida
Department of Environmental Protection,226 Scalia, writing the
plurality opinion, recognized the possibility of a judicial taking
(that is, “a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially
changes established property rights”227): “[T]he Takings Clause
bars the State from taking private property without paying for it,
no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.”228 Chief
Justice John Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito
joined the part of the opinion recognizing a judicial taking.229 Justice Stevens took no part in the decision, and the other four justices would have held that it was not necessary to decide the viability of judicial takings in this case,230 with Kennedy, joined by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, strongly objecting to the possibility.231
The legal status of judicial takings is thus unclear. At least one
academic, cited by Kennedy in his concurring opinion,232 observes
that “courts [ ] view themselves as radically different from the
other branches of government,” and that “the Supreme Court is
unlikely to apply the takings protections eagerly to judicial
changes in property law.”233

223

Id at 382.
Id.
225 Barton H. Thompson Jr, The History of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and
Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan L Rev 1373, 1375 (1992) (emphasis added).
226 560 US 702 (2010).
227 Id at 737 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
228 Id at 715 (Scalia) (plurality).
229 Id at 707 (Scalia) (plurality).
230 Stop the Beach, 560 US at 742 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“[T]he plurality unnecessarily addresses questions of constitutional law that
are better left for another day.”).
231 Id at 733–34 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
232 Id at 740 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), citing
Barton H. Thompson Jr, Judicial Takings, 76 Va L Rev 1449, 1515 (1990).
233 Thompson, 76 Va L Rev at 1541–42 (cited in note 232).
224
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Even if judicial takings are possible, it is unclear what remedy can be rendered in the Obergefell context. In response to
Kennedy’s view that the only remedy in a takings case, judicial
or otherwise, is “just compensation,”234 Scalia replied that “[i]f
[the Court] were to hold that the [lower court decision] had effected an uncompensated taking in the present case, . . . [the
Court] would simply reverse the . . . judgment.”235 It seems unlikely that the Court would repeal either Obergefell or Harper to
render a remedy for judicial takings, and it is unclear what judgment is left to be reversed.
The difficulty lies in an important distinction between the
Obergefell-Harper regime and the judicial takings discussed in
both Scalia’s plurality and Kennedy’s concurrence: neither
Obergefell nor Harper is a direct change of property law, while
the cases discussed in the Stop the Beach opinions are. Disturbing
third-party property interests is a side effect, rather than a direct
result, of the Obergefell-Harper regime.236
The distinction is vital. For instance, a prerequisite for applying the Takings Clause is that the complainant lawfully owns the
property in the first place, which is also a prerequisite for the application of the Due Process Clause.237 In the Amy and Margaret
scenario described in the Introduction, if the retroactivity rule applies (which is not itself a change in the property rule), the transaction is invalid under previously existing state property law, and
Mark never lawfully owned the house in the first place—there is
no taking, and, for that matter, no due process violation.

234 Stop the Beach, 560 US at 740–41 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
235 Id at 723 (Scalia) (plurality).
236 Stop the Beach itself involved a state supreme court’s decision to recharacterize
certain littoral rights. See id at 712. Kennedy also highlighted the importance of “incremental modification under state [property] law”:

Consider the instance of litigation between two property owners to determine
which one bears the liability and costs when a tree that stands on one property
extends its roots in a way that damages adjacent property. If a court deems that,
in light of increasing urbanization, the former rule for allocation of these costs
should be changed, thus shifting the rights of the owners, it may well increase
the value of one property and decrease the value of the other.
Id at 738 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
237 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va L Rev
885, 886–87 (2000) (“Starting in 1972 with its landmark decision in Board of Regents v.
Roth, [ ] the Court has become increasingly insistent that persons seeking protection for
economic interests under either the Due Process or Takings Clauses must establish they
have ‘property’ if they are to avoid dismissal of their lawsuit.”) (citation omitted).
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Kennedy suggested in Stop the Beach that the Due Process
Clause is a sufficient safeguard against judicial change of property law greater than the “the type of incremental modification
under state common law that does not violate due process.”238 He
pointed out that “[t]he Court would be on strong footing in ruling
that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes
established property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of
the owner, is ‘arbitrary or irrational’ under the Due Process
Clause.”239 As illustrated above, however, the distinction between
the Obergefell-Harper regime and the cases cited in Stop the
Beach—and the difficulty that distinction creates—is equally applicable to the Due Process Clause argument.
Scalia pointed out that it is not clear whether, according to
Kennedy, the procedural or the substantive facet of the Due Process Clause functions as a replacement for the Takings Clause.240
If it is substantive due process, after Lochner v New York,241 the
Court has long held that “the ‘liberties’ protected by substantive
due process do not include economic liberties.”242 The procedural
due process case may be stronger, and may indeed be quite obvious. The difficulty here, however, is that the Court has never
identified a due process limitation on adjudicative retroactivity,
even when it could have in the Chevron Oil era of nonretroactivity.243 In fact, as one scholar points out, “[t]hose Justices who defended adjudicative nonretroactivity based on considerations of
fairness, notice, and reliance never argued that these factors were
of constitutional magnitude.”244
Besides, as discussed in Part III.D.1, the role of implied fundamental rights in Obergefell, a role which is of constitutional
magnitude, actually supports a strong retroactivity rule. This, in
turn, affects property interests. It is unclear that the procedural
due process argument necessarily preempts the retroactivity rule
in the Obergefell context, even if it does preempt the rule in other

238 Stop the Beach, 560 US at 738 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
239 Id at 737 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
240 Id at 719 (Scalia) (plurality).
241 198 US 45 (1905).
242 Stop the Beach, 560 US at 721 (Scalia) (plurality).
243 Fisch, 110 Harv L Rev at 1075 (cited in note 168) (“Even when the experiment
with prospective adjudication under the Chevron Oil test presented the opportunity for
the Justices to use due process arguments in support of nonretroactivity, none did so.”).
244 Id.
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contexts in which a property interest would be deprived without
prior notice.
It seems that the Constitution does not provide any clear
limit to retroactive applications of Obergefell that might lead to
property deprivation. In fact, according to several Supreme Court
justices, a failure to apply the new rule retroactively contravenes
the Constitution, specifically Article III.245 The Constitutional
Limits Theory thus does not provide a satisfactory basis for limiting the retroactivity of Obergefell.
***
In sum, the only limitation to the retroactive effect of Obergefell
is provided by the Remedial Exceptions Theory under certain particularized situations. It offers the most restricted legal protection
of reliance and property interests of the three theories, and does not
reach the level of constitutional protection. There is neither any viable constitutional limit to the retroactivity of Obergefell nor the
possibility of a general revival of the Warren Court technique of
nonretroactivity.
CONCLUSION
The release of the groundbreaking Obergefell decision calls
for a reexamination of the Supreme Court’s long-dormant retroactivity jurisprudence. The creation or declaration of an implied
fundamental right to marry may have significant disruptive effects on third parties’ reliance interests. This Comment concludes
that Obergefell retroactively applies to all pending and future
property cases even if the relevant transaction took place before
Obergefell, except (1) when government agencies refuse to give
the claimed benefits to both same-sex and opposite-sex married
couples, (2) when such application is barred by the operation of a
preexisting, independent state law that is itself constitutional
and has nothing to do with retroactivity, or (3) when there is a
disruption of important reliance interests coupled with significant policy justifications.
The first exception is available only to governments and inapplicable to situations involving private parties’ reliance. The
second is extremely narrow and most likely includes only general
procedural bars to bringing suit, such as statutes of limitations.
245 See, for example, text accompanying notes 81–82 (discussing Scalia’s opinion in
American Trucking).
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The third is available to protect private parties who entered into
pre-Obergefell property transactions with a same-sex spouse, in
reliance on the nonrecognition rule. None of the protections,
however, is of constitutional magnitude, and they afford only
narrow restrictions to the general rule of retroactivity under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.

